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KEY=1957 - GUERRA ELLIS

Gathering Of Human Intelligence In Counter-Insurgency Warfare: The French Experience During The Battle Of Algiers (January-October 1957) *Pickle Partners Publishing* If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society. In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence. Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu's 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended. In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture. Counter-Insurgency Lessons from the French-Algerian War The conclusion of World War II saw a number of colonial powers embroiled in counter-insurgency warfare in countries spread around the globe. These conflicts generated a great deal of research and analysis with respect to the critical elements of counter-insurgency warfare. The 1954-1962 French-Algerian War was one such conflict that offers valuable lessons for U.S. planners as they conduct operations in Iraq. There are four important aspects of French strategy that warrant closer examination. First, the French employed superb use of psychological operations at the unit level. Second, they were highly successful at gathering human intelligence. Third, they dispersed their forces through a strategy of quadrillage that separated the insurgents from the local population. Fourth, they conducted their operations using a measured response, avoiding reprisals and excessive use of force. This paper first highlights the significant events of the French-Algerian War. It then covers the four lessons mentioned above, analyzing the historical details and discussing salient points of application for U.S. military operations in Iraq. Finally, it concludes with some recommendations for consideration by current military planners. Though incorporation of these four elements will not guarantee military success in Iraq, they have significant applications for U.S. forces as they conduct counter-insurgency operations there. (10 refs.). *Blue Fish in a Dark Sea: Police Intelligence in a Counterinsurgency* *Legend Press Ltd* "The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea." Mao Tse-Tung claimed in *On Guerilla Warfare* that the guerrilla move seamlessly amongst the people. If the guerrilla are the fish and the people the sea, then police intelligence are the blue fish which live and hunt in that sea alongside them. All modern counterinsurgency theories rely on separating the people from the insurgent. But Randall Wilson's *Blue Fish In A Dark Sea* contends that the use of police intelligence will allow for a different approach; of separating the insurgent head from the insurgent body so that the body is seen by people as an infection, ridding it of a protective camouflage. The existence of police intelligence and its unique, but all too often marginalised capacity for uncovering and destroying the prime movers of an insurgency must be re-examined. It is by no means a panacea for civil strife but, as an integral component of a combined counterinsurgency strategy, it provides a weapon which is more feared by insurgents than any other. Knowing who they are and where they're hiding renders the insurgent visible and touchable. In *Blue Fish In A Dark Sea: Police Intelligence in a Counterinsurgency*, Wilson explores and discusses the various elements of police intelligence ubiquitous to the trade, and presents the most efficacious means of employing this skill set in the environment of a counterinsurgency. *Interrogation in War and Conflict A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Analysis* *Routledge* This edited volume offers a comparative and interdisciplinary analysis of interrogation and questioning in war and conflict in the twentieth century. Despite the current public interest and its military importance, interrogation and questioning in conflict is still a largely under-researched theme. This volume's methodological thrust is to select historical case studies ranging in time from the Great War to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, and including the Second World War, decolonization, the Cold War, the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland and international justice cases in The Hague, each of which raises interdisciplinary issues about the role of interrogation. These case-studies were selected because they resurface previously unexplored sources on the topic, or revisit known cases which allow us to analyse the role of interrogation and questioning in intelligence, security and military operations. Written by a group of experts from a range of disciplines including history, intelligence, psychology, law and human rights, *Interrogation in War and Conflict* provides a study of the main turning points in interrogation and questioning in twentieth-century conflicts, over a wide geographical area. The collection also looks at issues such as the extent of the use of harsh techniques, the value of interrogation to military intelligence, security and international justice, the development of interrogation as a separate profession in intelligence, as well as the relationship between interrogation and questioning and wider society. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, counter-terrorism, international justice, history and IR in general. *Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies* *Rand Corporation* Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that U.S. forces need more-effective techniques and procedures to conduct counterinsurgency. It is likely that U.S. forces will face similar, irregular warfare tactics from future enemies that are unwilling to engage in conventional combat with U.S. forces. This monograph examines the nature of the contemporary insurgent threat and provides insights on using operational analysis techniques to support intelligence operations in counterinsurgencies. The authors examine the stages of an insurgency and discuss the kinds of intelligence that are needed at each stage. A number of techniques--pattern discernment and predictive analysis, for example--appear to show promise of being useful to intelligence analysis. The authors also explore two closely connected methods in depth to examine the interactions between friendly and enemy forces: game theory and change detection. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual *University of Chicago Press* When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency. The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine. An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come. The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America's injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org. *Taking Intelligence Analysis to the Next Level Advanced Intelligence Analysis Methodologies Using Real-World Business, Crime, Military, and Terrorism Examples* *CRC Press* *Taking Intelligence to the Next Level: Advanced Intelligence Analysis Methodologies Using Real-World Business, Crime, Military, and Terrorism Examples* examines intelligence gathering and analysis and the significance of these programs. Coverage assumes a basic understanding of the intelligence cycle and processes, and the book builds upon the author's previous text, *Intelligence Analysis Fundamentals*—also published by CRC Press—to further address various types of intelligence, the function and increasing usage of intelligence in both the private and public sectors, and the consumption of intelligence products to inform strategic decision-making. Developed for a classroom environment, chapters are packed with multiple examples, visuals, and practical exercises tailored for the intelligence community (IC), military intelligence analyst, criminal, or business analyst alike. The text begins with a chapter on analytical ethics, an important topic that sets the tone for those to come that cover intelligence gathering analytical techniques. The author utilizes multiple instructive learning approaches to build on the student's existing analytical skills gained from other training resources, their experience, or some other combination. While topics covered are germane to all intelligence analysis fields—including military, national, political, criminal, and business—specific chapters and sections and most instructional examples, scenarios, exercises, and learning activities focus on the Homeland Security Mission and the associated problem sets. The training presentation methods and instructional approaches are the product of much thought, research, and discussion, and a variety of US government and commercial analytical training methodologies are presented. The book closes with a final chapter looking at future trends in intelligence analysis. **Key Features:** Provides tools to challenge intelligence assessments systematically and objectively, a prerequisite to vetted intelligence conclusions Outlines diagnostic techniques to explain events or data sets, anticipate potential outcomes, predict future trends, and make decisions for optimal outcomes Details how to conduct research to effectively write, edit, format, and disseminate reports to best effect An accompany Instructor's Guide, for use in the classroom, contains the same practical exercises as those found in the student text, as well as facilitator's guides, practical exercise solutions, discussion points, sample test questions, and answer keys, to include other websites that can provide additional instructional content. *Taking Intelligence to the Next Level* serves as an essential course textbook for programs in intelligence, terrorism, and Homeland Security in addition to serving a useful reference for practicing professionals. Ancillaries including PowerPoint lecture slides, as well as the Instructor's Guide with Test Bank, are available for qualified course adopters. *Modern Warfare A French View of Counterinsurgency* *DIANE Publishing* *Rule of Law in War International Law and United States Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan* *Oxford University Press*, *USA Rule of Law in War* places international law at the centre of the transformation of United States counterinsurgency (COIN) that occurred during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It claims international law matters more than is often assumed and more than we have previously been able to claim, contradicting existing theoretical assumptions. In particular, the book contends international law matters in a case that may be regarded as

particularly tough for international law, that is, the development of a key military doctrine, the execution of that doctrine on the battlefield, and the ultimate conduct of armed conflict. To do so, the book traces international law's influence in the construction of modern U.S. COIN doctrine, specifically, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, released by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps in December 2006. It then assesses how international law's doctrinal interaction held up in Iraq and Afghanistan. The account of this doctrinal change is based on extensive access to the primary actors and materials, including FM 3-24's drafting history, field documents, and interviews with military officers of various ranks who have served multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. War by Other Means--Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Final Report *Rand Corporation* Examines how the United States should improve its counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities through, for example, much greater focus on understanding jihadist strategy, using civil measures to strengthen the local government, and enabling local forces to conduct COIN operations. Provides a broad discussion of the investments, organizational changes, and multilateral arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities. Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies Second Edition *Createspace Independent Publishing Platform* From the preface: "The 1966 'Human Factors' edition focused on the contemporary threat of Maoist insurgencies, particularly in Southeast Asia, and also drew extensively on World War II resistance movements in Europe. Much of this information is still relevant and has been retained and integrated. In the post-Cold War world, the most important insurgencies tend to be ethnic and religious. Long-simmering conflicts, sometimes with roots in colonial policies, have become prominent; examples include the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom or ETA) in Spain, the Hutu-Tutsi genocides, the Ushtia ϕ irimtare e Kosov ϕ s (Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA), and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). Battle lines in these conflicts are often drawn along ethnic lines, even when land or politics are the immediate issues in contention. The other important new category is extremist religious movements, most prominently Islamic groups, including regional insurgent movements like Hizbollah and Harakat al-Muqawamah al'Isla ϕ miyyah (Islamic Resistance Movement, or HAMAS) and global movements like Al Qaeda. These present a different profile of ideology, organizational forms, and psychology than either Cold War Maoists or post-colonial ethnic insurgencies (although the Palestinian cause could be considered a post-colonial issue). Globalization has also changed underground operations in numerous ways. Insurgencies, enabled by low-cost transportation, Internet based communications, and other information technologies, can more easily recruit, communicate, and operate across borders. It is correspondingly much more difficult to contain an insurgency in a region. Global media has led to development of new tactics, in particular new types of terrorism, designed to capture worldwide attention. Compared with what was available in the 1960s, there are orders of magnitude more academic research available relevant to this study's topics. We were able to draw on more recent work in psychology, political science, economics, sociology, organizational studies, and communications studies. Readers of this edition will, over the course of eleven chapters, get a wide exposure to basic concepts from a number of disciplines". The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency *Routledge* This new handbook provides a wide-ranging overview of the current state of academic analysis and debate on insurgency and counterinsurgency, as well as an up-to date survey of contemporary insurgent movements and counter-insurgencies. In recent years, and more specifically since the insurgency in Iraq from 2003, academic interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency has substantially increased. These topics have become dominant themes on the security agenda, replacing peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and terrorism as key concepts. The aim of this volume is to showcase the rich thinking that is available in the area of insurgency and counterinsurgency studies and act as a further guide for study and research. In order to contain this wide-ranging topic within an accessible and informative framework, the Editors have divided the text into three key parts: Part I: Theoretical and Analytical Issues Part II: Insurgent Movements Part III: Counterinsurgency Cases The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency will be of great interest to all students of insurgency and small wars, terrorism/counter-terrorism, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general, as well as professional military colleges and policymakers. The Humanity of Warfare Social Science Capabilities and the Evolution of Armed Conflict *Bookbaby* ABSTRACT The Humanity of Warfare: Social Science Capabilities and the Evolution of Warfare addresses the changing nature of conflict and the new focus represented in the Counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine. Now that the population's welfare is placed at the center, understanding the populations and social dynamics becomes critical. Military commanders and the population's welfare are inextricably intertwined and victory now depends upon the success of this paradigm-shifting doctrine. This book takes a penetrating look at the socio-cultural enablers, subject matter experts and social scientists who assist the military in understanding the indigenous culture and populations they hope to serve and protect. Throughout the course of the book the reader gains an understanding of how the Social Scientist can help the military understand the key socio-cultural issues, dynamics, and leaders necessary to achieve success. Chapter two demonstrates specific examples of relevant socio-cultural products that have greatly enhanced the military's ability to interact successfully with the population of Afghanistan. Chapter three informs the respective commanders on how to best enable their socio-cultural team with specific needs and requirements. Chapter four demonstrates the critical skills, education, and abilities socio-cultural team members must have to be successful in a conflict environment. Chapter five reveals peacetime socio-cultural capabilities designed to inform and prepare military commands by bringing the unique perspectives, analysis, and socio-cultural expertise into their processes to create the most culturally prepared deploying unit as humanly possible before deployment. In short, to fully exploit the socio-cultural capability with the goal to protect lives within vulnerable populations and the occupying soldiers, and achieve objectives. The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Campaigns The United States increasingly relies on unmanned aerial vehicles to target insurgent and terrorist groups around the world. This monograph analyzes the available research and evidence that assesses the political and military consequences of drone strikes. It is not clear if drone strikes have degraded their targets, or that they kill enough civilians to create sizable public backlashes against the United States. Drones are a politically and militarily attractive way to counter insurgents and terrorists, but, paradoxically, this may lead to their use in situations where they are less likely to be effective and where they are difficult to predict consequences. Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book Counterinsurgency, Security Forces, and the Identification Problem Distinguishing Friend From Foe *Routledge* This book presents a theory and empirical evidence for how security forces can identify militant suspects during counterinsurgency operations. A major oversight on the part of academics and practitioners has been to ignore the critical antecedent issue common to persuasion and coercion counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches: distinguishing friend from foe. This book proposes that the behaviour of security forces influences the likelihood of militant identification during a COIN campaign, and argues that security forces must respect civilian safety in order to create a credible commitment to facilitate collaboration with a population. This distinction is important as conventional wisdom has wrongly assumed that the presence of security forces confers control over terrain or influence over a population. Collaboration between civilian and government actors is the key observable indicator of support in COIN. Paradoxically, this theory accounts for why and how increased risk to government forces in the short term actually improves civilian security in the long run. Counterinsurgency, Security Forces, and the Identification Problem draws on three case studies: the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines post-World War II; Marines Corps' experiences in Vietnam through the Combined Action Program; and Special Operations activities in Iraq after 2003. For military practitioners, the work illustrates the critical precursor to establishing "security" during counterinsurgency operations. The book also examines the role and limits of modern technology in solving the identification problem. This book will be of interest to students of counterinsurgency, military history, strategic studies, US foreign policy, and security studies in general. From Northern Ireland to Afghanistan British Military Intelligence Operations, Ethics and Human Rights *Routledge* Moran concentrates on three aims: to provide an overview of British military intelligence operations in the last 30 years which concentrates on operational not strategic intelligence; to examine the debates over ethics and effectiveness that have followed these operations; and to examine the increasing attempts to place military intelligence under the same type of regulation that police and security intelligence operations have been subject to. As such, he provides a timely overview of intelligence effectiveness and ethics in this area of heightened interest and relevance in terms of the recent UK deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the light of the UK Strategic Defence Review. This book is not a philosophical discussion of military ethics; nor is it a study of operations alone. In the light of experiences from Northern Ireland to Afghanistan, it examines the debates over effectiveness which have surrounded British military intelligence activities whilst tying these debates closely to the ethical issues they raise. Each stage of operations is evaluated in context. Interest will cut across disciplines and as such this book will appeal to intelligence, counter-terrorism, military studies, politics, human rights and philosophy practitioners, scholars and students. Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Volume 2 *Rand Corporation* Examines the deleterious effects of the U.S. failure to focus on protecting the Iraqi population for most of the military campaign in Iraq and analyzes the failure of a technologically driven counterinsurgency (COIN) approach. It outlines strategic considerations relative to COIN; presents an overview of the conflict in Iraq; describes implications for future operations; and offers recommendations to improve the U.S. capability to conduct COIN. Interrogation, intelligence and security Controversial British Techniques *Manchester University Press* Interrogation, Intelligence and Security examines the origins and effects of a group of interrogation techniques known as the 'five techniques'. Through its in-depth analysis the book reveals how British forces came to use these controversial methods. Focusing on the British colony of Aden (1963-67), the height of 'the troubles' in Northern Ireland (1971), and the conflict in Iraq (2003), the book explores the use of hooding to restrict vision, white noise, stress positions, limited sleep and a limited diet. There are clear parallels between these three case studies and the use of controversial interrogation techniques today. Readers will be able to make informed judgements about whether, on the basis of the results of these cases, interrogation techniques that might be described as torture can be justified. This book will be of particular interest to security professionals, academics and members of the public interested in the torture debate, intelligence, the military, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, foreign policy and law enforcement. Tactics in Counterinsurgency - FM 3-24.2 *CreateSpace* This field manual establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for tactical counterinsurgency (COIN) operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today's operational environment (OE)—an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This manual is generic in its geographic focus and should be used with other doctrinal sources. • Chapter 1, Operational Environment of Counterinsurgency, defines insurgent and counterinsurgent while using the operational variables and mission variables to describe the OE. Finally, it stresses developing a culture capability for Soldiers and leaders. • Chapter 2, Foundations of Insurgency, categorizes insurgent groups by their components—elements, dynamics, and strategies and their manifestations—tactics, strengths, and vulnerabilities. • Chapter 3, Foundations of Counterinsurgency, covers the seven lines of effort, tactical considerations, clear-hold-build operations, and counterinsurgency phases. • Chapter 4, Planning in Counterinsurgency, arguably the most important chapter, covers planning for tactical units during counterinsurgency operations. It also covers planning horizons and targeting. • Chapter 5, Offensive Operations in Counterinsurgency, addresses offensive techniques used by tactical units during counterinsurgency operations. • Chapter 6, Defensive Operations in Counterinsurgency, addresses defensive techniques used by tactical units during counterinsurgency operations. • Chapter 7, Stability Operations in Counterinsurgency, addresses stability techniques used by tactical units during counterinsurgency operations. • Chapter 8, Working with Host Nation Security Forces, covers the seven steps (MORTEAM) units use to train, advise, and partner with Host Nation security forces. Solving the People Puzzle Cultural Intelligence and Special Operations Forces *Dundurn* The 21st century has brought global instability, and special operations forces are the logical force of choice for success. As a group that favours humans over hardware, it makes sense that their tool of choice is cultural intelligence. Spencer makes a convincing argument for the powerful union of the force of choice with the tool of choice. Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia Assessing the Campaign Against Al Shabaab *Rand Corporation* This report analyzes the U.S. and allied campaign against the al Qa'ida-linked terrorist group al Shabaab in Somalia, examines what steps have been most successful against the group, and identifies potential recommendations. It concludes that, while al Shabaab was weakened between 2011 and 2016, the group could resurge if urgent steps are not taken to address the political, economic, and governance challenges at the heart of the conflict. Money in the Bank--Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Paper 4 *Rand Corporation* Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to

failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Future U.S. COIN operations can learn from these past lessons. Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency *University of Chicago Press* Global events of the early twenty-first century have placed new stress on the relationship among anthropology, governance, and war. Facing prolonged insurgency, segments of the U.S. military have taken a new interest in anthropology, prompting intense ethical and scholarly debate. Inspired by these issues, the essays in *Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency* consider how anthropologists can, should, and do respond to military overtures, and they articulate anthropological perspectives on global war and power relations. This book investigates the shifting boundaries between military and civil state violence; perceptions and effects of American power around the globe; the history of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice; and debate over culture, knowledge, and conscience in counterinsurgency. These wide-ranging essays shed new light on the fraught world of Pax Americana and on the ethical and political dilemmas faced by anthropologists and military personnel alike when attempting to understand and intervene in our world.

Cyberterrorism The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes *Council of Europe* Cyberterrorism and the misuse of Internet for terrorist purposes represents a serious threat, since many essential aspects of today's society are completely dependent upon the functioning of computer systems and the Internet. Further to the adoption by the Council of Europe of the Cybercrime Convention (2001) and the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005), its Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER) has been studying this matter and surveying the situation in member states to evaluate whether existing legal instruments are sufficient to combat this emerging form of crime. This publication contains an expert report prepared by the Max Planck Institute, which evaluates the main problems that arise in the context of cyberterrorism and provides recommendations, together with reports on the situation in the member and observer states of the Council of Europe and the relevant Council of Europe conventions

Tactics in Counterinsurgency At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population. Support can be achieved or lost through information engagement, strong representative government, access to goods and services, fear, or violence. This armed struggle also involves eliminating insurgents who threaten the safety and security of the population. However, military units alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Most of the work involves discovering and solving the population's underlying issues, that is, the root causes of their dissatisfaction. *Tactics In Counterinsurgency* provides the reader with the tactical leadership skills necessary to handle these diverse issues. Intelligence and Strategic Culture *Routledge* Reliable information on potential security threats is not just the result of diligent intelligence work but also a product of context and culture. The volume explores the nexus between the intelligence process and strategic culture. How can and does the strategic outlook of the United States and the United Kingdom in particular, influence the intelligence gathering, assessment and dissemination process? This book contains an assessment of how political agendas and ideological outlook have significant influence on both the content and process of intelligence. It looks in particular at the premise of hearts and minds policies, culture and intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency operations; at case studies from imperial Malaya and Iran in the 1950s and at instances of intelligence failure, e.g. the case of Iraq in 2003. How was intelligence, or the lack thereof, a product of political culture and how did it play a role in the political praxis? The book shows that political agendas and the ideological outlook have a significant influence upon both the content and process of intelligence. This book was originally published as a special issue of *Intelligence and National Security*.

Paths to Victory Lessons from Modern Insurgencies *Rand Corporation* When a country is threatened by an insurgency, what efforts give its government the best chance of prevailing? Contemporary discourse on this subject is voluminous and often contentious. Advice for the counterinsurgent is often based on little more than common sense, a general understanding of history, or a handful of detailed examples, instead of a solid, systematically collected body of historical evidence. A 2010 RAND study challenged this trend with rigorous analyses of all 30 insurgencies that started and ended between 1978 and 2008. This update to that original study expanded the data set, adding 41 new cases and comparing all 71 insurgencies begun and completed worldwide since World War II. With many more cases to compare, the study was able to more rigorously test the previous findings and address critical questions that the earlier study could not. For example, it could examine the approaches that led counterinsurgency forces to prevail when an external actor was involved in the conflict. It was also able to address questions about timing and duration, such as which factors affect the duration of insurgencies and the durability of the resulting peace, as well as how long historical counterinsurgency forces had to engage in effective practices before they won. A companion volume, *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies*, offers in-depth narrative overviews of each of the 41 additional cases; the original 30 cases are presented in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*.

Instruments of Statecraft U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counter-terrorism, 1940-1990 *Pantheon* Uses recently declassified documents to survey the American use of covert warfare against terrorists and adversarial states

Human Terrain Teams An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare This study explains the performance of Human Terrain Teams, why the large majority of commanders found them useful, and why collectively they did not ameliorate-much less reverse-growing cross-cultural tensions between U.S. forces and Afghans. It examines the tremendous challenges the Human Terrain Team program faced in starting and rapidly expanding a non-traditional military capability, and why some challenges were met successfully while others were not. First, a historical analysis explains how external forces and management decisions affected team performance. An organizational analysis then explains the variations in team performance by examining the teams with variables substantiated by previous studies of small cross-functional teams. Finally, all available commander observations on Human Terrain Team performance are analyzed to better determine why commanders were satisfied or dissatisfied with their teams. The insights from the three analyses-historical, organizational and commander assessments-are then integrated. The results demonstrate that Human Terrain Teams had to overcome numerous organizational limitations to perform well, but that they were able to meet the expectations of commanders who did not fully appreciate the optimum role the teams could play in an integrated counterinsurgency strategy.

The Battle of the Casbah Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957 *Enigma Books* This book is particularly relevant to the current debate on terrorism. That story constitutes the main part of this book. It details the methods used, including torture and summary executions, and the results obtained by the paratrooper commando units led **Winning Wars amongst the People** *Case Studies in Asymmetric Conflict* *Potomac Books, Inc.* Since the end of World War II a paradigm shift has occurred in armed conflict. Asymmetric, or fourth-generation warfare is the challenge of nonstate belligerents to the authority and power of the state. It has become the dominant form of conflict, while interstate conventional war has become an increasingly irrelevant instrument of statecraft. In asymmetric conflicts the enemy is often a fellow citizen with a different vision for the future of the country. Waging war among the people, maneuvering on the borderlines between parliamentary politics, street politics, criminal activity, and combat operations. **Winning Wars amongst the People** analyzes the special circumstances of asymmetric conflicts in the domestic context and seeks to identify those principles that allow a democratic state's security forces to meet the challenge, while at the same time obey their homeland's laws, protect its culture, observe its values, and maintain its liberties, traditions, and way of life. Using five detailed case studies, Peter A. Kiss explains the fundamental differences between the paradigm of conventional warfare and that of asymmetric warfare as well as the latter's political, social, and economic roots and main characteristics. Most important, he identifies the measures a government must take to prepare its security forces and other institutions of state for an asymmetric conflict.

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Counterinsurgency *Oxford University Press* David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas "are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west" (Washington Post). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced the United States' decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the Surge," now recognized as a dramatic success. In *Counterinsurgency*, Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic. Here is a picture of modern warfare by someone who has had his boots on the ground in some of today's worst trouble spots-including Iraq and Afghanistan-and who has been studying counterinsurgency since 1985. Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insights, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency, indispensable for all those interested in making sense of our world in an age of terror.

Subversion and Insurgency *RAND Counterinsurgency Study* *Paper 2* *Rand Corporation* Subversion is a critical insurgent tool, but it has long been ignored by policymakers and analysts. This paper presents a set of case studies to explore the elements of subversion and discusses preliminary ideas for combating subversive activities in the context of the "long war" against violent Islamic extremism.

Insurgency and Counter Insurgency: A Dangerous War of Nerves *A Dangerous War of Nerves* *KW Publishers Pvt Ltd* This book is primarily an effort to study the phenomenon called insurgency that has been posing a huge challenge to the internal security of the country. Though a wealth of literature on the subject already exists, a need was felt to analyse the multiple facets of insurgency as no country barring India has witnessed this endemic for a prolonged period. The subject is so vast and dynamic that no strait-jacketed solution can be prescribed to curb this menace overnight. However, an attempt has been made to analyse this phenomenon and prescribe remedial antidotes. The author has attempted to capture the origin of insurgency which dates back to a late 18th century, and study various causes and numerous factors that fuel it. In addition, he has also attempted to study the doctrines and strategies, with special emphasis on both Islamic insurgency and other forms of uprisings in the country that continue to pose challenges to the Indian security environment. Owing allegiance to his uniform, the author has also attempted to bring out the role of air power in counterinsurgency operations. The penultimate chapter deals with shaping a viable counter-insurgency strategy and spells out the essential parameters, principles and pitfalls of such a strategy. The chapter also dwells on the political aim and the importance of a socio-economic turnaround to scale down insurgency. The use of calibrated force rather than brutal armed suppressive methods is advocated. Will insurgencies ever end? This lingering question is discussed in the final chapter and certain essential strategies, both military and non-military, are spelt out which would provide occasions and opportunities to forge a lasting solution to insurgency in India.

How Insurgency Begins Rebel Group Formation in Uganda and Beyond *Cambridge University Press* Why do only some incipient rebel groups become viable challengers to governments? Only those that control local rumor networks survive. **Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies** *National Styles and Strategic Cultures* *Cambridge University Press* A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.

Dimensions of Counter-insurgency Applying Experience to Practice *Routledge* The once-neglected study of counter-insurgency operations has recently emerged as an area of central concern for Western governments and their military organizations. While counter-insurgency represents a hugely challenging form of contemporary warfare, there exists a considerable body of experience that offers assistance in the form of examples of both good and bad practice. The main aim of this book is to present these examples and the lessons that can be drawn from them. Such lessons can be of considerable benefit to today's policy-makers and military practitioners. The book also considers how these lessons can actually fit into the contemporary framework - as defined by military, political and institutional logic - that shapes and bounds today's counter-insurgency warfare. **Dimensions of Counter-Insurgency** explores a number of key themes including: the experience of counter-insurgency in the Middle East; the contribution of maritime and air forces; the challenges posed in adapting Western armed forces to their new tasks; and the responses made - in light of the perceived need for international action against insurgencies - by multilateral institutions such as NATO and the European Union. This book features a broad range of contributions from academics and military thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic. This was previously published as a special issue of *Contemporary Security Policy*.

The Third Dimension Air Power in Combating the Maoist Insurgency *Vij Books India Pvt Ltd* The Maoist Insurgency has been born out of long periods of social discontent, economic hardships and state apathy towards the neglected masses. Anti-Maoist operations have to be based on a strong political will, aggressive anti-guerrilla tactics and economic and social development of affected areas to win back the confidence of the people. A common perception is that in these operations, the role of air power is normally overlooked. History differs and tells us that air power has been used extensively to quell past insurgencies. This book explores the nature of insurgencies and air power lessons from past insurgencies. After analysing the Maoist insurgency, the employment of air assets in supporting the security forces is examined.